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Standing with a Bundle of Sticks: The
All Substantial Rights Doctrine in
Action
Mark J. Abate*
Christopher J. Morten†
This Article provides an overview of the Federal Circuit’s all
substantial rights doctrine. Surveying decades of case law, this
Article seeks to clarify this confusing area of the law and set out
the essential rules for those engaged in patent licensing, patent
assignment, and patent litigation. This Article begins by explaining
why effective ownership of a patent is critical to standing, and then
describes the framework through which courts determine whether
a party is, in fact, in possession of all substantial rights and is
therefore the effective owner. While there are many factors that
courts may consider, certain rights take priority in this analysis,
the right to enforce being the most important. This Article
concludes by providing guidance on how to structure an
agreement to ensure that these rights are allocated predictably and
reliably to convey effective ownership of the patent.
*

Mark Abate, a Partner at Goodwin Procter LLP, concentrates his practice on trials
and appeals of patent infringement cases, and has particular expertise in matters
involving electronics, computers, software, financial systems, and electrical, mechanical,
and medical devices. He has tried cases to successful conclusions in U.S. district courts
and the U.S. International Trade Commission and has argued appeals before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. He is the former President of both the New
York Intellectual Property Law Association and the New Jersey Intellectual Property
Law Association, and is a board member of the Federal Circuit Historical Society.
†
Christopher Morten is an Associate at Goodwin and Procter and a member of the
firm’s Intellectual Property Litigation Practice. He focuses on patent matters, with an
emphasis on chemistry and the life sciences. He has experience in district court litigation,
including Hatch-Waxman litigation, as well as trials at the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, patent prosecution, and patent strategy and counseling.
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INTRODUCTION
The owner of a patent may sue for infringement of that patent.1
This rule is easily applicable when the patent has been granted to a
single party and the rights were never transferred to another.
However, the question of ownership becomes more complicated
when the rights have been sold or licensed. This is particularly true
if, as is common today, an assignment involves the division of the
rights in a particular patent among more than one party.2 In this
situation, the framework to identify the true patent owner or
owners, who must be a plaintiff in the infringement lawsuit to
establish standing, is known as the “all substantial
rights” analysis.3
As this Article explains below, the all substantial rights
standard is simple in theory: a party that possesses all of the
substantial rights in a patent is the effective patent owner, with
standing to bring an infringement suit in its own name.4 A party
that possesses less than all substantial rights in the patent is not the
effective patent owner and must join the patent owner if it brings
suit.5 Yet the standard can be tricky in practice. When determining
whether a particular party is effectively the patent owner with
standing to bring suit on its own, courts, including the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, have tended to characterize
their analysis as a totality of the circumstances, case-by-case
balancing of factors.6 These rather complex opinions make it
1

See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012).
See, e.g., Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d
1354, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
3
See id. at 1359–60.
4
See id. at 1359.
5
See, e.g., Propat Int’l Corp. v. RPost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
6
See, e.g., Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1360–61 (“Our prior decisions have never
purported to establish a complete list of the rights whose holders must be examined to
determine whether a licensor has transferred away sufficient rights to render an exclusive
licensee the owner of a patent. But we have listed at least some of the rights that should
be examined.”); AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“While any of these restrictions alone might not have been destructive of the
transfer of all substantial rights, their totality is sufficient to do so.”); Sicom Sys. Ltd. v.
Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e must assess the
Agreement at issue, weighing the rights in the patent transferred to Sicom against those
2
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difficult to elucidate black-letter rules. However, over time, certain
patterns have emerged.7 Parties negotiating the transfer of patent
rights require confidence that they can structure an agreement to
ensure that all substantial rights reside where the parties intend.
This can be achieved by following a few guiding principles set
forth below.8
Part I of this Article introduces the doctrines of constitutional
and prudential standing and explores why effective patent
ownership is necessary for a party to bring a patent infringement
suit in its own name. Part II explains the metaphor of a patent as a
“bundle of rights,”9 each of which can be individually sold,
licensed, or otherwise transferred. This Part also introduces the
Federal Circuit’s “all substantial rights” analysis, which weighs the
rights within the bundle possessed by a particular party in order to
determine whether that party possesses all substantial rights (and
therefore constitutes the effective patent owner, with standing to
sue in its own name). Part III shows that for a party to qualify as
the effective patent owner, the party must possess a right to
practice the patent. Part IV provides a survey of the Federal
Circuit’s implementation of the all substantial rights analysis and
illuminates the individual rights within the “bundle” that the
Federal Circuit has identified as most important: first and foremost,
the right to enforce, followed by the right to alienate and the right
to indulge infringement. Part V shows that while other rights
within the bundle may be considered by courts, they tend to be less
important and rarely or never dispositive. Part VI concludes by
showing that it is the substance, and not the form, of an agreement
transferring patent rights that controls the all substantial
rights analysis.

retained by Canada, to determine whether Canada assigned all substantial rights in the
patent, or fewer than all such rights.”).
7
See infra Parts III–VI.
8
See infra Parts III–VI.
9
See infra text accompanying notes 44–45.
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I. WHY PATENT OWNERSHIP MATTERS: THE PROBLEM
OF STANDING
What drives the concern over who owns a patent? Ownership is
critical because only a party in possession of the exclusionary
rights conferred by the Patent Act is injured by infringement of the
patent.10 Only the owner of all substantial rights in the patent may
bring suit on its own, without joining another plaintiff (or
plaintiffs).11 This issue often arises in the analysis of a plaintiff’s
rights as an exclusive licensee,12 but it can also involve the division
of patent rights along other lines, such as those enumerated later in
Part III. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
explained that there are two distinct types of standing requirements
that must be met for a party to sue on its own: constitutional
standing and prudential standing.13
A. Constitutional Standing
Every court must determine whether the plaintiff has the right
to bring its dispute before the court. “Article III, § 2 of the
Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’ or
‘Controversies.’ The doctrine of constitutional standing serves to
identify which disputes fall within these broad categories and
therefore may be resolved by a federal court.”14 “For a party to
establish constitutional standing, it must ‘show that the conduct of
10

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 281 (2012); Propat, 473 F.3d at 1193 (“A party
that is neither the legal owner of the patent nor the transferee of all substantial rights in
the patent still has standing to sue for infringement if that party has a legally protected
interest in the patent created by the Patent Act, so that it can be said to suffer legal injury
from an act of infringement.”).
11
See, e.g., Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1359–60.
12
See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1350–51
(Fed. Cir. 2016); AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Sicom Sys. Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 978–79 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
13
See Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also
13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531
(3d ed. 2018) (“Standing requirements have been drawn from two sources, constitutional
and prudential.”).
14
WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1263–64 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. III, § 2).
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which [it] complains has caused [it] to suffer an “injury in fact”
that a favorable judgment will redress.’”15 The Supreme Court has
characterized the necessary “injury in fact” as “an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized;
and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or
“hypothetical.”’”16
In the context of patent infringement litigation, the plaintiff’s
injury is created by statute. Under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a), every patent
grants to the patentee “the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States.”17
The Federal Circuit has “explained that a party has the right to sue
for infringement of the patent ‘if that party has a legally protected
interest in the patent created by the Patent Act, so that it can be
said to suffer legal injury from [the] act of infringement.’”18
“Because the Patent Act creates the legally protected interests in
dispute, the right to assert infringement of those interests comes
from the Act itself.”19
WiAV Solutions LLC v. Motorola, Inc. and other Federal
Circuit decisions recognize that an exclusive licensee has
constitutional standing to sue an infringer.20 However, this is
merely a first step, as constitutional standing suffices to bring suit
but does not, on its own, suffice to bring suit alone. As this Article
explains below, additional prudential standing concerns dictate
that, pursuant to the Patent Act, “[u]nlike the patentee or the
transferee of all substantial rights in the patent . . . a [mere]
exclusive licensee ordinarily may not sue in its own name alone,
15

Id. at 1264 (alteration in original) (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)).
16
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
17
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012); see also id. § 271(a). Notably, “[a] patentee shall have
remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.” Id. § 281.
18
WiAV, 631 F.3d at 1264 (alteration in original) (quoting Propat Int’l Corp. v. RPost,
Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
19
Id. at 1264–65.
20
See id.; see also, e.g., Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
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but must join the patent owner in an action brought against an
accused infringer.”21
B. Prudential Standing
Understanding the all substantial rights doctrine requires an
appreciation of the concept of “prudential standing”—even if the
requirements of constitutional standing are met, a court may deny
standing when, for prudential reasons, it decides that a plaintiff’s
case does not warrant a decision on the merits.22 Supreme Court
precedent concerning issues of standing has articulated certain
prudential factors that limit who can bring suit,23 known as the
“prudential standing” doctrine.24 As the Supreme Court stated in
Allen v. Wright:
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially selfimposed limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a
litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the
rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances
more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s
21

Propat, 473 F.3d at 1193.
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3531; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2685 (2013) (noting that prudential standing “embodies ‘judicially self-imposed
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction’” (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004))).
23
E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12 (“Although we have not
exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine, we have
explained that prudential standing encompasses ‘the general prohibition on a litigant’s
raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the
law invoked.’” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386, 1388 (2014))).
24
Some commentators have questioned the continued vitality of the prudential
standing doctrine, as distinct from the core requirements of constitutional standing, in
view of the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lexmark International. 134 S. Ct. at 1386,
1388 (holding that courts “cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely
because ‘prudence’ dictates”). However, after Lexmark International, the Federal Circuit
has continued to ground the all substantial rights framework in prudential standing.
See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1349–50 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
22
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complaint fall within the zone of interests protected
by the law invoked.25
In the context of patent infringement, several prudential
concerns come into play. These concerns underlie the rule that an
exclusive licensee who does not have all substantial rights in the
patent ordinarily may not sue in its own name alone.26 One
prudential concern is that an infringement suit brought by an
exclusive licensee alone risks invalidating or otherwise
undermining the value of the patent, thereby harming the interests
of the missing patent owner(s): “[A] patent should not be placed at
risk of invalidation by the licensee without the participation of the
patentee.”27 The Supreme Court identified another prudential
concern, the risk of subjecting defendants to multiple suits for the
same act of infringement.28 Obliging an exclusive licensee “with
less than all substantial rights, such as a field of use licensee, to
join the patentee before initiating suit” reduces this risk.29 The
Federal Circuit has further noted, as a corollary to the risk of
subjecting a defendant to multiple suits, the risk “of
inconsistent relief.”30
Notably, concerns over assuring representation of all rights
holders, avoiding repeated litigation, and avoiding inconsistent
judgments are the same concerns that underlie Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 19, which broadly governs the required joinder of
parties in federal court.31 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has, at
times—if not consistently—entwined its standing analysis with
Rule 19 and the concept of joinder of a necessary and
25

468 U.S. at 751.
See, e.g., Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
27
Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., 504 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
28
See Int’l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 504 F.3d 1273, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (first citing Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494 (1850); then citing Pope
Mfg. Co. v. Gormully & Jeffery Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. 248, 251–52 (1892); and then citing
Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 38 (1923)).
29
Id.
30
E.g., A123 Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
31
See, e.g., Howard P. Fink, Indispensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment to
Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 403, 414–22 (1965); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 19
(governing “Required Joinder of Parties”).
26
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indispensable party. For example, A123 Systems, Inc. v. HydroQuebec expressly connects prudential standing with Rule 19:
Under long-standing prudential standing precedent,
an exclusive licensee with less than all substantial
rights in a patent, such as a field-of-use licensee,
lacks standing to sue for infringement without
joining the patent owner. In general, as we discuss
below, an accused infringer must likewise join both
the exclusive licensee and the patentee in a
declaratory action because the patentee is a
necessary party.32
The Federal Circuit has held that a patent owner is almost
always at least a necessary party to an infringement suit under Rule
19(a), so long as joinder is “feasible.”33 However, the court has
also cautioned that standing and Rule 19 joinder are two distinct
analyses, and there is no “per[ ]se rule that patent owners are
automatically indispensable parties—there is no patent-specific
exception to Rule 19(b).”34 Alfred E. Mann Foundation for
Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp. recognized that “when a
necessary patent owner is not joined, even when Rule 19(a) is
satisfied, the court must still perform the inquiry under Rule 19(b)
to determine whether that owner is indispensable.”35

32
626 F.3d at 1217 (citations omitted). A123 relies on an earlier Federal Circuit
decision, Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1998), which
expressly invoked Rule 19. A123 Sys., 626 F.3d at 1217 (“Having found Geapag to be
without standing for failing to join the patentee, it follows that the court lacks jurisdiction
over Enzo’s declaratory judgment claims under [FED. R. CIV. P.] 19 for nonjoinder.”
(citing Enzo APA, 134 F.3d at 1094)).
33
Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Forderung Der Wissenschaften E.V.,
734 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
34
Id.
35
Id. (citing Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d
1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
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C. Additional Comments on Standing and the Origins of the All
Substantial Rights Doctrine
A party has standing to sue in its own name only when it is the
effective owner of a patent; i.e., when it possesses all substantial
rights in the patent. As the Federal Circuit has explained:
Either the licensor did not transfer “all substantial
rights” to the exclusive licensee, in which case the
licensor remains the owner of the patent and retains
the right to sue for infringement, or the licensor did
transfer “all substantial rights” to the exclusive
licensee, in which case the licensee becomes the
owner of the patent for standing purposes and gains
the right to sue on its own. In either case, the
question is whether the license agreement
transferred sufficient rights to the exclusive licensee
to make the licensee the owner of the patents in
question. If so, the licensee may sue but the licensor
may not. If not, the licensor may sue, but the
licensee alone may not.36
Ultimately, “the question is ‘who owns the patent’? Does the
transfer or retention of certain rights amount to an assignment of
the patent or not?”37
The remainder of this Article discusses the “all substantial
rights” standard, as articulated by the Federal Circuit, and provides
several practical tips for structuring the transfer of patent rights.
Before diving into the substance, this Article makes a few
additional points. First, the question of whether a party possesses
all substantial rights in a patent and therefore constitutes the
patentee, able to bring suit independently, is a question of law
controlled by Federal Circuit precedent, rather than precedents of
the regional circuits.38 Second, because the question of patent
36

Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1359–60.
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
38
See WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Bd.
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 840
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The Federal Circuit ‘defers to the law of the regional circuits on
matters of procedural law that do not implicate issues of patent law.’” (emphasis added)
37
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ownership ultimately governs the question of standing, a
jurisdictional issue, the all substantial rights issue can be raised at
any time.39 Indeed, if it perceives a potential standing issue, a court
has the power to address the question of patent ownership
sua sponte.40
Third, the question of patent ownership is important in almost
every transfer of patent rights. As indicated by the cases discussed
below, effective transfer of patent ownership requires more than
simple transfer of title. Indeed, as discussed in more detail in Part
VI, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have reiterated that
form does not control.41 An agreement that purports to “reassign”
ownership of a patent from an assignor to a new assignee may not
actually transfer ownership if the new assignee does not obtain the
requisite rights.42 On the flip side, an agreement that purports to be
a mere license preserving ownership in the hands of the licensor
may, for all intents and purposes, make the licensee the effective
patent owner.43 For this reason, throughout the discussion that
follows, this Article refers generically to a “buyer” and “seller” of
patent
rights,
rather
than
“licensor”/“licensee”
or
“assignor”/“assignee.” The “buyer” and “seller” may also be
viewed as the “transferee” and “transferor,” respectively, of the
patent rights.

(quoting Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2003))),
aff’d, 563 U.S. 776 (2011).
39
See Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device All., Inc., 240 F.3d 1016, 1018 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“[T]he issue of whether an exclusive licensee has sufficient rights in a patent to
bring suit in its own name is jurisdictional and, therefore, is not waived by a party’s
failure to raise the issue in the district court.”); see also, e.g., Evident Corp. v. Church &
Dwight Co., 399 F. 3d 1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
40
See, e.g., AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
41
See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 256 (1891); A123 Sys., Inc. v. HydroQuebec, 626 F.3d 1213, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
42
See, e.g., Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 618
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1117 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)).
43
See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
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II. THE “BUNDLE OF RIGHTS”
A patent confers a “bundle of rights” upon the patentee, and a
patentee may choose to transfer any number of those rights to a
licensee or assignee.44 The more substantial the rights obtained by
the buyer (and, consequently, the less substantial the rights left
with the seller), the more likely it is that a court will find that all
substantial rights have been transferred.45 “Under Waterman [v.
Mackenzie] and its successors, the critical determination regarding
a party’s ability to sue in its own name is whether an agreement
transferring patent rights to that party is, in effect, an assignment or
a mere license.”46
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the determination of
whether a party possesses all substantial rights in a patent is based
on the allocation of rights at the time the complaint is filed.47 A
defective agreement that intends but fails to transfer all substantial
rights from seller to buyer cannot be cured by a later execution of a
nunc pro tunc48 amended agreement. In Enzo v. Geapag, the
Federal Circuit held that “nunc pro tunc assignments are not
sufficient to confer retroactive standing.”49 Citing Enzo, the
Federal Circuit held in Alps South, LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co.
that the question of whether a licensee “may be considered a
‘patentee’” turns on “whether the licensee possesses ‘all substantial
rights’ at the time the complaint was filed.”50
44

Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that a patent provides its owner with “a bundle of rights which
may be divided and assigned, or retained in whole or part”).
45
See, e.g., Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d
1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that in the licensing context, “the question is whether
the license agreement transferred sufficient rights to the exclusive licensee to make the
licensee the owner of the patents in question”).
46
AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citing the Supreme Court’s foundational decision in Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S.
252 (1891)).
47
See Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
48
See Nunc pro tunc, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “nunc pro
tunc” as “[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a court’s inherent power”)
(emphasis added).
49
Enzo, 134 F.3d at 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
50
787 F.3d 1379, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (citing Enzo, 134 F.3d at
1093); see also Diamond Coating Techs. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 621
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When addressing the question of whether a given agreement
transfers all substantial rights in a patent, a court is free to examine
any and all rights in the bundle.51 In its analysis, a court should
“weigh[] the rights in the patent transferred to [the buyer] against
those retained by [the seller], to determine whether [the seller]
assigned all substantial rights in the patent, or fewer than all such
rights.”52 The Federal Circuit has also encouraged courts to
consider the parties’ intent in this analysis.53
The Federal Circuit has stated that there is no single,
exhaustive list of rights a court must consider “to determine
whether a licensor has transferred away sufficient rights to render
an exclusive licensee the owner of a patent.”54 While the Federal
Circuit has “never purported to establish a complete list” of the
rights that a court should consider,55 it has, over the years,
articulated quite a few. These run the gamut from the most
important rights, like the right to practice and enforce the patent, to
relatively minor ones, like the right to let the patents expire for the
nonpayment of maintenance fees.56 Among the rights that have
been enumerated and considered by the Federal Circuit, the
Authors have identified the following:
(1) the right to make, import, use, and/or sell products covered
by the patent;

(Fed. Cir. 2016) (reaffirming the rule that “[n]unc pro tunc assignments are not sufficient
to confer retroactive [patentee status]” (alteration in original) (quoting Alps S.,
787 F.3d at 1384)).
51
See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
52
Sicom Sys. Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
53
E.g., id. at 979 (“[T]his court has established that the intention of the parties to the
Agreement and the substance of what was granted are relevant factors in determining
whether all substantial rights in a patent were conveyed.”); Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med.
Device All., Inc., 240 F.3d 1016, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A court] must ascertain the
intention of the parties and examine the substance of what was granted . . . .”); Vaupel
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccania Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“We must . . . examine whether the agreements transferred all substantial rights to the
’650 patent and whether the surrounding circumstances indicated an intent to do so.”).
54
Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1360.
55
See id.
56
See generally Parts III–V.
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(2) the right to enforce—i.e., to sue infringers;
(3) the right to alienate rights and interests in the patent,
through sale or other transfer;
(4) the right to indulge infringement, and the related right to
settle any infringement dispute;
(5) the right to license or sublicense;
(6) the right to supervise licensees;
(7) the right to be informed and/or consulted in the event of
litigation or licensing activity by the other party;
(8) any reversionary right possessed by the seller;
(9) the right to share in royalties or damages that flow from
the patent;
(10) the right to prosecute child applications and foreign
counterparts; and
(11) the obligation to pay maintenance fees and the right to let
the patent expire for nonpayment of fees.57
The Federal Circuit has never held that any particular right
within the bundle is too small to merit consideration in the all
substantial rights analysis.58 Moreover, at times, the Federal
Circuit has suggested that no single right within the bundle is ever
truly dispositive.59 However, two clear rules have emerged: (1) To
57

See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1347,
1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (considering rights 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, and 11 enumerated above);
Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1360–61 (considering rights 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11);
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(considering rights 1, 2, 5, and 8); Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of
Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (considering rights 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7,
and 9); Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 875 (considering rights 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10).
58
Because courts are permitted to consider even relatively minor rights in their
analysis, the “all substantial rights” analysis could have evolved into a quantitative
analysis of who owns substantially all of the patent rights. See infra Part V. However, the
Federal Circuit has tended to focus its analysis more qualitatively on the question of who
owns the most substantial rights within the bundle. See supra note 57.
59
See, e.g., AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1321
(considering certain limits on a buyer and holding that “[w]hile any of these restrictions
alone might not have been destructive of the transfer of all substantial rights, their totality
is sufficient to do so”).
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possess all substantial rights, a buyer must possess the right to
practice the patent; and (2) assuming that precondition is met, the
right to enforce the patent is usually dispositive. As this Article
explains below, a party that lacks the right to enforce is very
unlikely to possess all substantial rights, and therefore will be
unable to establish that it possesses standing to sue for patent
infringement in its own name.
III. A PRECONDITION: THE BUYER’S RIGHT TO PRACTICE
As noted in Part I, the right to practice the patent in full—that
is, the right to make, use, offer to sell, sell, and import the patented
invention—is a necessary but not always sufficient precondition
for the transfer of all substantial rights.60 In its recent decision
Diamond Coating Technologies, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America,
the Federal Circuit considered an agreement that, inter alia, did
“not even grant [the buyer] a right to practice the patents-in-suit”
and held that, “in this respect, [the buyer] unquestionably failed to
acquire all substantial rights.”61
This rule dates back more than a century to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Waterman v. Mackenzie, which focused on the
“right to make, use, and vend the invention or discovery.”62
Waterman held that “the grant of an exclusive right . . . which does
not include the right to make, and the right to use, and the right to
sell, is not a grant of a title in the whole patent-right within the
district, and is therefore only a license.”63 Waterman held that any
subdivision of the individual rights that collectively make up the
right to practice the patent—e.g., “a grant of ‘the exclusive right to
make and use,’ but not to sell, patented machines”—would

60

See supra Section I.A (explaining that an exclusive right to practice the invention is
necessary for constitutional standing to bring an infringement suit, because it is violation
of that exclusive right that creates an “injury” under the Patent Act).
61
823 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
62
138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891).
63
Id. at 256.
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necessarily mean that the buyer possessed, in effect, less than the
whole patent.64
In the context of standing, the injury that gives rise to the right
to sue for patent infringement is the infringement of the right to
practice the claimed invention that the patent confers.65 An
exclusive right to practice the patent is a necessary precondition for
injury under the Patent Act and for constitutional standing.66 “To
be an exclusive licensee for standing purposes, a party must have
received, not only the right to practice the invention within a given
territory, but also the patentee’s express or implied promise that
others shall be excluded from practicing the invention within that
territory as well.”67
The Federal Circuit has further held that certain restrictions on
the buyer’s right to practice the patent preclude the transfer of all
substantial rights68: First, a field-of-use restriction69 is “fatal” to the
transfer of all substantial rights, even if the buyer’s right to practice

64

Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 546, 548 (1872)).
However, a territorial restriction on a buyer’s rights has been held not to preclude the
transfer of all substantial rights, such that an exclusive territorial licensee may have
standing to sue absent the patent owner. See id. at 256. According to Waterman, a full
assignment of the patent, or assignment of “the exclusive right under the patent within
and throughout a specified part of the United States,” will “vest[] in the assignee a title in
so much of the patent itself, with a right to sue infringers,” so that the assignee may do so
“in the name of the assignee alone.” Id.; see also Int’l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games,
Inc., 504 F.3d 1273, 1276 (Fed Cir. 2007).
65
See supra Part I.
66
See supra Section I.A. As this Article explains in Part V.B below, a seller of a patent
may retain a right to practice the patent as well as a limited right to sublicense the patent
without preventing the buyer from enjoying an “exclusive” right to practice. See Alfred
E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“The first step is to determine whether the license is exclusive or nonexclusive,
because [the licensee] would have no right to sue, even by joining [the patent owner],
under a nonexclusive license agreement.”).
67
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
68
See, e.g., Alps S., LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co., 787 F.3d 1379, 1383
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
69
Field-of-Use Restriction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
“field-of-use restriction” as “[a] license provision restricting the licensee’s use of the
licensed property to a defined product or service market or to a designated
geographical area”).
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is otherwise exclusive and unencumbered.70 Second, a hard
expiration date on the buyer’s rights, prior to expiration of the
patent, also precludes transfer of all substantial rights. In Aspex
Eyewear, the Federal Circuit held that a buyer that obtains rights
“for only a fixed period of years . . . does not meet the all
substantial rights standard.”71
The scope of the buyer’s right to practice has rarely been the
focus of the Federal Circuit’s all substantial rights analyses, and in
many cases the right is presumed and not mentioned. An
agreement need not expressly grant the buyer the right to
practice—or enumerate the individual rights to make, use, sell,
etc.—as the buyer’s right to practice may be (and often is)
subsumed into a broader grant of all rights and interests in
the patent.72
An important consequence of the rule that all substantial rights
require a right to practice—and a potentially helpful practice tip—
is that any agreement that purports to transfer to the buyer the
exclusive right to enforce the patent (even absent participation by
the seller), without also transferring the right to practice the patent,
is insufficient to transfer all substantial rights (or to confer
70

Alps S., 787 F.3d at 1383–84 (observing that “[p]recedent dictates that the original
agreement’s field of use restriction is fatal to Alps’s argument that it had standing to file
this action” without joining the patent owner, and holding that “[b]ecause the license
restricted Alps’s rights in the ’109 patent to the field of prosthetic products, Alps lacked
standing to pursue this litigation without naming AEI as a co-plaintiff”); see also Bard
Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 776 F.3d 837, 843 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (observing that, among other encumbrances on the buyer’s rights, “there was a
field of use restriction,” and holding that “[t]here was no basis . . . to conclude that [the
seller] had transferred ‘all substantial rights’”); Int’l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games,
Inc., 504 F.3d 1273, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that the all substantial rights doctrine
“compels an exclusive licensee with less than all substantial rights, such as a field of use
licensee, to join the patentee before initiating suit”).
71
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
see also id. at 1342–43 (“By having rights for only a limited portion of the patent term,
[the buyer] simply did not own the patent. It was merely an exclusive licensee without all
substantial rights.”).
72
See, e.g., Suffolk Techs. LLC v. AOL Inc., 910 F. Supp. 2d 850, 856 (E.D. Va.
2012) (holding that an agreement’s transfer of the “entire right, title[,] and interest” in a
patent implicitly included transfer of the “right to make, use, and sell the invention
covered by” the patent (quoting contract language from the agreement at issue
in the case)).
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constitutional standing on the buyer): “A ‘right to sue’ provision
within a license cannot, of its own force, confer standing on a bare
licensee.”73 Hence, a buyer with the right to enforce, but without
the right to practice, cannot show injury.74
Finally, while the buyer’s right to practice must be exclusive
with respect to third parties, a seller’s retained right to practice the
patent does not necessarily preclude the transfer of all substantial
rights, so long as the buyer’s right to practice is otherwise
exclusive.75 The seller’s right to practice can be structured as a
retained right, or can alternatively be structured as a license from
the buyer back to the seller.76 This Article discusses this issue
further in Section V.B.
IV. THE HEART OF THE ALL SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS:
WEIGHING THE MOST IMPORTANT RIGHTS WITHIN THE BUNDLE
When the essential precondition of the right to practice the
patent has been met, a court moves to the heart of the all
substantial rights analysis: weighing the various rights within the
“bundle.”77 Rather than set forth cut and dry rules as to which
rights a buyer must always hold to possess all substantial rights, the
Federal Circuit has tended to characterize its analysis as a flexible,
holistic balancing test.78 However, a clear hierarchy has emerged,
with a handful of rights weighed most heavily in the court’s
balancing. As this Article explains below, the right to enforce the
patent has emerged as the single most important in the Federal
73

Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (observing
that even if a right-to-enforce “provision were read broadly to give [the buyer] an
independent right to sue in [the seller’s] name, such a provision would be ineffectual of
its own force”).
74
Recall that the core injury that gives rise to constitutional standing to sue for patent
infringement is a violation of “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering
for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention
into the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). A party that lacks a right to exclude
others is not injured by infringement. See supra Part I.
75
See infra Section V.B.
76
See infra Section V.B.
77
See supra text accompanying notes 51–53 for further explanation of this analysis.
78
See supra Part II.
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Circuit’s all substantial rights analysis.79 The right to alienate, as
well as the right to indulge infringement, tend to follow the right to
enforce in order of importance.80
A. The Single Most Important Right: The Right to Enforce
The most important right weighed in the all substantial rights
analysis is almost certainly the right to enforce. This is not
surprising given that the ultimate question the all substantial rights
inquiry addresses is whether the buyer can enforce the patent in its
own name.81 Meaningful encumbrances on the buyer’s right to sue
alleged infringers are very likely, if not certain, to preclude transfer
of all substantial rights and have been found dispositive in several
cases.82 By contrast, an agreement providing an unfettered right to
enforce the patent is more likely to be considered as having
transferred all substantial rights and conferred standing upon the
buyer.83 The Federal Circuit has stated that, “the exclusive right to
sue is ‘particularly dispositive’ in cases where . . . we are deciding
whether a patent owner must be joined as a party.”84 Whether a
patent owner (i.e., the seller) must be joined as a party essentially

79

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Sections IV.B–C.
81
See, e.g., Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 620
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that “[r]etaining control of [licensing or litigation] activities is []
critical to demonstrating that the patent has not been effectively assigned to the licensee”)
(alterations in original) (quoting Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1846 (2015)).
82
See, e.g., id. at 619–20; Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp.,
604 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Sicom Sys. Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d
971, 978–79 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1132
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
83
See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1350–51
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
84
AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875
(Fed Cir. 1991)); see also Keranos, LLC v. Silicon Storage Tech., Inc., 797 F.3d 1025,
1032 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating that the right to sue accused infringers is the most
important factor in determining whether all substantial rights have been transferred);
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed Cir. 2006) (“A
key factor has often been where the right to sue for infringement lies.”).
80
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entails the same analysis as whether the buyer has all
substantial rights.85
In case after case, the Federal Circuit has held that restrictions
on a buyer’s ability to sue was at least a significant factor, if not
the most significant factor, in preventing the transfer of all
substantial rights in the patent.86 Indeed, to the Authors’
knowledge, in every instance where the court has considered an
agreement that did not provide the buyer with an unfettered right to
enforce the patent on its own, it has concluded that the buyer did
not possess all substantial rights.87
In Abbott Laboratories v. Diamedix Corp., the Federal Circuit
held that an exclusive licensee possessed less than all substantial
rights in a patent, given that the licensor reserved the right to sue
for infringement if the licensee declined to do so, and that the
licensee was “obligated under the agreement not to ‘prejudice or
impair the patent rights [of the patentee] in connection with’ [the
licensee’s own litigation].”88 In holding that the licensee “may not
sue on its own for infringement,” Abbott quoted Vaupel
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A. for the rule
that transfer of the exclusive right to sue is “particularly
dispositive.”89 In Sicom Systems Ltd. v. Agilent Technologies, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit held that an exclusive licensee possessed fewer
than all substantial rights in a patent, given, inter alia, that the
licensor retained a right to sue noncommercial accused infringers,
having transferred to the licensee only the right to sue commercial
infringers.90 In Alfred E. Mann Foundation for Scientific Research
v. Cochlear Corp., the Federal Circuit held that an exclusive
licensee did not possess all substantial rights in the patent, in light
85

See, e.g., AsymmetRx, 582 F.3d at 1319–20 (noting how the buyer must have all
substantial rights in the patent to bring suit on its own without the seller
(i.e., patent owner)).
86
Diamond Coating Techs., 823 F.3d at 620–21; Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1362;
Sicom Sys., 427 F.3d at 978–79; Abbott Labs., 47 F.3d at 1132.
87
See generally supra notes 82–84 (cataloguing various cases on how an exclusive
right to sue affects an all substantial rights determination).
88
Abbott Labs., 47 F.3d at 1132 (quoting the agreement at issue in the case).
89
Id. (quoting Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 875) (citing Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 875–76).
90
427 F.3d at 978–80.

2018]

STANDING WITH A BUNDLE OF STICKS

497

of the fact that the patentee reserved the right to sue for
infringement if the licensee declined to do so.91
One case, Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., looks at first glance as
if it might be an outlier.92 In Speedplay, the buyer did not obtain an
unfettered right to enforce the patent, as the seller retained some
rights to sue, but the court nonetheless held that the buyer
possessed all substantial rights.93 The Federal Circuit held that the
seller’s retained rights were irrelevant because the buyer possessed
the ability to grant royalty-free licenses at will to any party sued by
the seller.94
By contrast, an absence of restrictions on a buyer’s ability to
sue has consistently been found by the Federal Circuit to indicate
the transfer of all substantial rights in the patent.95 Notably, in
Vaupel the seller retained numerous rights, including: “1) [A] veto
right on sublicensing . . . ; 2) the right to obtain patents on the
invention in other countries; 3) a reversionary right to the patent in
91

604 F.3d at 1362; see also, e.g., Diamond Coating Techs., 823 F.3d at 620–21
(noting that the seller retained significant control over the buyer’s enforcement and
litigation activities, and concluding on the basis of this and other factors that fewer than
all substantial rights had been transferred); Clouding IP, LLC v. Google Inc., 61 F. Supp.
3d 421, 434 (D. Del. 2014) (holding that an exclusive licensee possessed fewer than all
substantial rights in a patent, given that, inter alia, the licensor could “circumvent [the
licensee’s] decision to allow infringement and, instead, bring suit directly as a
counter-plaintiff”).
92
211 F.3d 1245, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
93
Id.
94
Id. (“[The sellers’] right to sue an infringer if [the buyer] does not is illusory,
because [the buyer] can render that right nugatory by granting the alleged infringer a
royalty-free sublicense.”)
95
See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that “the transfer of the right to sue for infringement is critical”
and holding that an exclusive licensee possessed all substantial rights in view of the fact
that the patentee, “has not retained the right to sue here”); Keranos, LLC v. Silicon
Storage Tech., Inc., 797 F.3d 1025, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Importantly, [the assignor]
did not retain the right to sue accused infringers, which ‘is the most important factor in
determining whether an exclusive license transfers sufficient rights to render the licensee
the owner of the patent.’” (quoting Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1361)); Vaupel
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(noting that “[t]he agreements also transferred the right to sue for infringement of the . . .
patent, subject only to the obligation to inform [the seller]” and holding that all
substantial rights had, in fact, been transferred).
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the event of bankruptcy or termination of production . . . ; and 4) a
right to receive infringement damages, . . .” Nonetheless, the
court—focusing on the “particularly dispositive” right to enforce—
held that all substantial rights had been transferred to the buyer.96
Thus, a potentially useful practice point emerges from the case
law on the right to enforce. If the parties intend to transfer
ownership, an agreement should transfer from seller to buyer the
sole and undivided right to sue for infringement and to defend the
patent. With some exceptions, the seller should not retain a right to
veto or otherwise interfere with the buyer’s infringement litigation.
However, as this Article explains in Section V.B, the Federal
Circuit has held that a seller may retain certain rights to grant
licenses or releases to parties accused of infringement, without
precluding the transfer of all substantial rights. For example, when
a patent is assigned or ownership is otherwise transferred, the
patent remains subject to pre-existing licenses and other
obligations, which can include a licensee’s right to
grant sublicenses.97
B. The Right to Alienate
After the right to enforce, the hierarchy of the remaining rights
within the bundle is less clear. However, the buyer’s right to
alienate (e.g., to sell, transfer, or reassign) its rights is arguably the
next most important consideration. Agreements that restrict a
buyer’s right to alienate are unlikely to transfer all substantial
rights, although such restrictions are less certain to be
determinative than restrictions on the right to enforce.
In Abbott, the court noted that a licensor (Diamedix) had
retained “the right to prevent Abbott from assigning its rights
under the license to any party other than a successor in business,”
and held that such a right is of “the sort that are commonly held
sufficient to make a patent owner who grants an exclusive license a
necessary party to an infringement action brought by the
licensee.”98 Thus Abbott seems to hold that restrictions on a
96
97
98

944 F.2d at 875.
See infra Section V.B.
47 F.3d 1128, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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buyer’s right to alienate its rights in the patent make the seller a
necessary party (and the buyer the holder of less than all
substantial rights in the patent).99 In Sicom, the licensor’s retention
of a right to veto an exclusive licensee’s attempts to reassign its
license was concordantly a factor in finding that all substantial
rights had not been transferred.100 But in Intellectual Property
Development, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of California, Inc., the court
held that all substantial rights had been transferred to an exclusive
licensee even though the licensor retained, inter alia, the right to
prevent the licensee from assigning its license without the
licensor’s written consent.101 Therefore, although the right to
alienate is arguably the next most important consideration in the all
substantial rights analysis, it is not always dispositive.102
C. The Right to Indulge Infringement
Compared to the right to sue for infringement—which, as noted
above, is of paramount importance—the Federal Circuit has been
less clear on the importance of the right to indulge103 (i.e., to
permit) infringement. The right not to enforce the patent could be
viewed as the flip side of the right-to-enforce coin, and at least one
case has implied that it may be of equal importance.104 In Abbott,
the Federal Circuit specifically enumerated restrictions on the
buyer’s right to indulge infringement—the seller’s retained “right
to bring suit on the patents if [the buyer] declined to do so”—as
well as limits on the buyer’s ability to alienate its patent rights, and
the seller’s ongoing “right to make, use, and sell products

99

See id.
See Sicom Sys. Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
101
See Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
102
See id.
103
The right to indulge infringement may be viewed as the right to waive the right to
enforce and thereby, permit infringement to go unpunished. “Implicit in the right to
exclude is the ability to waive that right . . . .” Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222
F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
104
See Abbott Labs., 47 F.3d at 1132 (observing that “the right to indulge
infringements . . . normally accompanies a complete conveyance of the right to sue”); see
also Sicom Sys., 427 F.3d at 978 (noting the holding in Abbott Labs).
100
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embodying the patented inventions,” in concluding that all
substantial rights had not been transferred.105
Following Abbott, the Federal Circuit considered in Alfred E.
Mann an exclusive license agreement that gave the patent owner a
right to bring an infringement suit on its own if the licensee
declined to do so.106 “[I]f [exclusive licensee] AB declined to bring
an infringement action against an infringer, [assignee] AMF was
permitted to file suit.”107 The Federal Circuit held that “[b]ecause
AB cannot indulge infringements for an unlimited time . . . AB
holds substantially less than the complete right to sue.”108 The
Alfred E. Mann decision concluded that the exclusive licensee’s
inability to indulge infringement for an unlimited time made it
possess “substantially less than the complete right to sue.”109
In the same vein, in Diamond Coating Technologies the
Federal Circuit addressed an agreement that limited the buyer’s
“discretion to refrain from suing certain companies,” as evidenced
by, for example, a list of companies included within the agreement
“which [the buyer] ‘reserves the right not to assert the [patents-insuit] against.’”110 The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court
that, “if [the buyer] has unfettered discretion on enforcement, then
[the list] would be superfluous.”111 The agreement in Diamond
Coating Technologies further included a “list of ‘companies that
[the seller] reasonably believes represent licensing opportunities’
and restrict[ed] [the buyer’s] ability to remove companies from
that list.”112 The Federal Circuit considered such restrictions on the
105

47 F.3d at 1132, 1133.
See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
107
Id. at 1363.
108
Id.
109
Id. (“Thus, AMF’s retained right to sue is significant, and so we hold that the license
agreement was not a virtual assignment of the patents-in-suit to AB.”).
110
Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 621 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor
Am., Nos. 8:13–cv–01480–MRP, 8:13–cv–01481–MRP(DFM), 2015 WL 2088892, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015)).
111
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Diamond Coating Techs., 2015 WL
2088892, at *6).
112
Id. (quoting agreement at issue in the case, marked J.A. 249, 256).
106
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right to indulge infringement to limit the right to enforce—namely,
a provision granting the buyer the right to enforce the patent in its
“reasonable sole discretion,” and requiring it to take into
consideration the best interests of the seller in bringing suit.113 The
court concluded that, together, “[t]hese provisions show that [the
seller] retained significant control over [the buyer’s] enforcement
and litigation activities.”114
However, there are perhaps not yet enough cases addressing
the significance of the right to indulge infringement to confirm that
its importance places it in the same elite class as the right to
enforce. What is clear is that an absence of restrictions on the
buyer’s right to indulge infringement support a conclusion that all
substantial rights have been transferred to the buyer.
V. LESS IMPORTANT RIGHTS WITHIN THE BUNDLE
Beyond the rights to enforce, alienate, and indulge
infringement, the Federal Circuit has tended to place less emphasis
on the remaining rights within the bundle. For example, the court
has tended to find that all substantial rights have been transferred
even when the seller retains a monetary interest in the patent, or
when the seller retains a license to practice the patent itself.115
A. The Seller’s Retained Monetary Interest
In its recent decision Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown
Electronics Co., the Federal Circuit held, rather unequivocally, that
a seller’s ongoing “financial interest in litigation and licensing
without more does not amount to a substantial right forcing joinder
of the patentee.”116 Luminara made clear that provisions granting a
seller continuing monetary interests of various types, including
interests in both licensing revenues and any damages collected
from infringement litigation, are consistent with an assignment of

113
114
115
116

Id. at 620 (quoting agreement at issue in the case, marked J.A. 209).
Id. at 621.
See infra Sections V.A–C.
814 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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the patent, rather than a mere license.117 This decision perhaps
reflects a modern understanding that the parties may want to
structure an agreement such that the consideration paid by the
buyer is contingent, at least in part, on the revenues the buyer is
able to extract from the patent. However, the origins of this rule
date back to the Federal Circuit’s foundational Vaupel decision,
holding that “the right to receive infringement damages” was not
substantial enough “to reduce the transfer to a mere license or
indicate an intent not to transfer all substantial rights.”118 Indeed,
this rule is grounded in the Supreme Court’s 1889 Rude v. Westcott
decision, which held that a seller’s continued share in a portion of
“sales, royalties, or settlements, or other source . . . does not, in any
respect, modify or limit the absolute transfer of title.”119
In Luminara, patentee Disney negotiated an exclusive license
to certain patents with licensee Luminara, then called Candella.120
Disney (and its affiliates) retained certain rights, including “the
right . . . to practice the patents; title to the patents; the
responsibility to pay maintenance fees to keep the patents in force;
a financial interest in litigation and licensing; and a right to notice
of litigation and licensing activities.”121 The court held that
Luminara nonetheless possessed all substantial rights in the
patents, and that “[n]one of [the] retained rights individually or
cumulatively are substantial enough to preclude Luminara from
bringing suit in its name alone.”122
Similarly, in Intellectual Property Development, the Federal
Circuit held that all substantial rights had not been transferred to
the buyer, despite the seller’s retention of, inter alia, a right to
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See id.
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875
(Fed. Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Propat Int’l Corp. v. RPost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1191
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he fact that a patent owner has retained a right to a portion of the
proceeds of the commercial exploitation of the patent . . . does not necessarily defeat
what would otherwise be a transfer of all substantial rights in the patent.”).
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130 U.S. 152, 162–63 (1889).
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814 F.3d at 1346.
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Id. at 1351.
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Id.
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share in any profits realized from litigation.123 In Vaupel, the court
considered a provision that required the buyer to pay to the seller
“‘any money damages obtained from third parties based on
infringement of [the patent]’ up to a maximum of five percent of
third party sales,” and held that this provision did not preclude
transfer of all substantial rights.124 In Bard, the court considered
that the seller had “retained the right to share in damages” as a
factor in concluding that all substantial rights had not been
transferred.125 The seller in Bard also imposed “a field of use
restriction” on the buyer’s right to practice the patent.126 As noted
above, the Federal Circuit has elsewhere held that a field of use
restriction is “fatal” to the transfer of all substantial rights.127
B. The Seller’s Retained Right to Practice and to (Sub)license
Like a seller’s retained financial interest, the Federal Circuit
has also found that a seller’s retained right to practice does not
preclude the transfer of all substantial rights.128 This is true even
when the seller reserves the right not only to practice the patent
itself, but to license or sublicense to affiliates, such as those with
whom it has a limited business relationship (i.e., a
franchise agreement).129
As an initial matter, it is clear that a seller’s retained right to
practice a patent does not prevent a buyer from becoming an
exclusive licensee with constitutional standing to sue. In the
Supreme Court’s 1926 decision, Independent Wireless Telegraph
123

See 248 F.3d 1333, 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875–76
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting agreement at issue in the case); see also Suffolk Techs. LLC v.
AOL Inc., 910 F. Supp. 2d 850, 857 (E.D. Va. 2012) (addressing a buyer’s obligation “to
pay to [the seller] [fifty-percent] of adjusted gross proceeds earned on” the patent and
holding that “[t]his obligation also represents [the seller’s] compensation for assigning
[the patent] to [the buyer] and is ‘not inconsistent with an assignment.’” (quoting Vaupel,
944 F.2d at 875)).
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776 F.3d 837, 843 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Alps S., LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co., 787 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, the original patentee granted an
exclusive license to its patent but “reserve[ed] to itself non[]exclusive, non[-]transferable, and personal rights to make, use,
and sell [patented devices] for defined purposes.”130 The Court
held that the licensee was nonetheless an exclusive licensee with
standing to sue for infringement alongside the patentee
as co-plaintiff.131
As noted in Part II, an exclusive license does not necessarily
confer prudential standing or the right to bring suit absent the
patent owner.132 There is a separate question of whether a seller’s
retained rights to practice and to sublicense a patent could preclude
transfer of all substantial rights in the patent. Luminara addressed
this issue in some depth and expressly concluded that the answer is
no: A seller’s retained rights to practice and to sublicense to
affiliates are significantly less important in the all substantial rights
analysis than a seller’s retained right to enforce the patent, and do
not preclude the transfer of all substantial rights.133 As noted
above, in Luminara the patentee, Disney, granted Luminara an
exclusive license but retained “the right for Disney Enterprises and
its Affiliates to practice the patents.”134 Disney’s licensed
“Affiliates” included “any other entity, theme park, or venue
operated by or under license from The Walt Disney Company or
any of its Affiliates.”135 This category encompassed third parties
with a license from Disney that “relate[d] to the operation of the
Affiliate in some way, such as with a franchise agreement.”136 The
court in Luminara concluded that Disney’s retained right to
practice the patents and to sublicense to third-party affiliates did
not preclude a transfer of all substantial rights: “[T]his is not a
substantial right requiring joinder . . . . The retained right to
practice a patent is not the same as a retained right to exclude

130
131
132
133
134
135
136

269 U.S. 459, 461 (1926).
See id. at 468.
See supra Section I.B.
See 814 F.3d at 1351.
Id.
Id. at 1348 (quoting agreement at issue in case, marked J.A. 420).
Id. at 1349.
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others from doing so.”137 Thus the seller’s retained right to practice
is clearly not dispositive.
The Luminara court did note that a seller’s retention of an
unfettered right to sublicense the patent to any and all third parties
would be inconsistent with the transfer of all substantial rights to
the buyer: “[I]f the patentee has retained the right to freely license
the patent, it stands to lose substantial rights if the claims are held
invalid or the patent held unenforceable.”138 At the same time,
Luminara sets forth a rule as to the type of sublicensing rights a
seller may retain: A patent owner may generally sell a patent
subject to a reserved right to practice the patent, and a reserved
right to sublicense the patent to parties with whom it has a limited
business relationship (such as a franchisor/franchisee relationship),
without preventing the transfer of all substantial rights.139 Beyond
this rule, Luminara suggests that the more limited a seller’s
retained right to sublicense to new third parties, the less likely this
retained right will interfere with transfer of all substantial rights.140

137

Id. at 1351. In certain other cases, the Federal Circuit has considered a seller’s
retained right to practice and concluded that all substantial rights had not been
transferred. However, these cases can be squared with Luminara by observing that other,
more important factors were present in these cases. In Abbott, the Federal Circuit
weighed the fact that the seller “retained a limited right to make, use, and sell products
embodying the patented inventions,” in concluding that “[u]nder Waterman and its
successors, Abbott . . . may not sue on its own for infringement.” 47 F.3d 1128, 1132
(Fed. Cir. 1995). But the seller in Abbott had also limited the buyer’s rights to enforce
and to alienate the patents. Id. “Unlike in Vaupel, [the seller in Abbott] retained . . . a
right to bring suit on the patents if Abbott declined to do so, and the right to prevent
Abbott from assigning its rights under the license to any party other than a successor in
business.” Id.; see also Fieldturf, Inc. v. Sw. Recreational Indus., Inc., 357 F.3d 1266,
1269 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that “the licensor’s retention of a limited right to develop
and market the patented invention indicates that the licensee failed to acquire all
substantial rights,” while the agreement in question also failed to grant the licensee any
right to enforce the patent).
138
Luminara, 814 F.3d at 1350.
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C. Even Less Significant Rights
Remaining rights within the “bundle” tend to be less significant
and will therefore be analyzed in less depth. While these rights
may be weighed in the court’s analysis, they are unlikely to be
determinative. These rights include reversionary rights possessed
by the seller and restrictions on the buyer’s ability to license
the patent.
As to reversionary rights, the Federal Circuit has held that a
“reversion of rights to the [seller] following breaches of the license
agreement” is a factor that weighs to some extent against finding
that all substantive rights were conveyed to the buyer.141 Yet the
court also held that “a reversionary right to the patent in the event
of bankruptcy or termination of production by” the buyer is not a
right “so substantial as to reduce the transfer to a mere license or
indicate an intent not to transfer all substantial rights.”142 That is, a
provision mandating the reversion of patent rights to the seller in
the event of the buyer’s failure to make payment, or another breach
of the agreement, does not preclude the transfer of all substantial
rights and is merely a factor in the analysis. By contrast, as noted
in Part IV, a hard termination date upon which the buyer’s rights
revert to the seller clearly precludes the transfer of all
substantial rights.143
As to restrictions on a buyer’s ability to license, Vaupel
considered a seller’s retained “veto right on sublicensing by” the
buyer and concluded that this did not prevent the transfer of all
substantial rights.144 This demonstrates that a seller’s right to
interfere with a buyer’s licensing activity does not
necessarily control.
141

Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1360–
61 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875
(Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 257–61 (1891)
(holding that assignment of a patent “subject to [a] mortgage” and reversionary interest
did not prevent transfer of title).
143
See Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
144
944 F.2d at 875.

2018]

STANDING WITH A BUNDLE OF STICKS

507

A practice point emerges from this Part—a seller of patent
rights may retain a rather large array of “less important” rights,
including a right to practice, a right to license or sublicense, and a
monetary interest in the patent, without precluding transfer of
effective patent ownership to the buyer.
VI. THE (UN)IMPORTANCE OF FORM
Having discussed the rights commonly considered in a court’s
analysis of whether all substantial rights have been transferred and
having identified the most important rights in that analysis, this
Article turns to the question of form—that is, the form of the
agreement that transfers patent rights between parties, whether it
be a license, an assignment, or another agreement. For example,
does it matter if a particular right is reserved by the seller of a
patent, rather than transferred to the buyer and then granted back to
the seller?
The case law generally instructs that it is the substance of the
agreement, and not its form, that controls. As noted above, the
Supreme Court held in 1891 that, “[w]hether a transfer of a
particular right or interest under a patent is an assignment or a
license does not depend upon the name by which it calls itself, but
upon the legal effect of its provisions.”145 The Federal Circuit has
reiterated this rule: “In determining ownership for purposes of
standing, labels given by the parties do not control. Rather, the
court must determine whether the party alleging effective
ownership has in fact received all substantial rights from the
patent owner.”146
Under the bundle-of-sticks analogy, the mechanism by which
each party obtains its respective rights—i.e., by reservation,
assignment, license, etc.—should not control the substantive
apportionment of those rights.147 The Federal Circuit has stated
145

Waterman, 138 U.S. at 256.
A123 Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
147
See id. From a purely practical perspective, and entirely separate from the all
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that “[w]e have not allowed labels to control by treating bare
formalities of ‘title’ transfer as sufficient to determine that an
‘assignment’ of the entire exclusive right has occurred.”148 Rather,
the Court explained that, “[t]o determine whether a provision in an
agreement constitutes an assignment or license, one must . . .
examine the substance of what was granted.”149 Thus, the answer is
that it should not matter whether a particular right is reserved by
the seller of a patent, rather than transferred to the buyer and then
granted back to the seller; the ultimate allocation of rights is
what matters.
CONCLUSION
To have standing to bring a suit for patent infringement in its
own name, a party must possess all substantial rights in the patent,
making it the effective owner—if not the formal owner—of the
patent.150 While the all substantial rights doctrine gives courts
discretion to consider the totality of the circumstances, a few key
considerations have emerged. First, a necessary (but not alone
sufficient) condition for possession of all substantial rights is an
unfettered right to practice the patent.151 Second, assuming that this
condition is met, the single most important right in the court’s
analysis is the right to enforce the patent (i.e., to bring suit against
alleged infringers), as any limitations on this right almost certainly
preclude possession of all substantial rights.152 Third, the right to
alienate rights held in the patent and the right to indulge
agreement itself. For example, from the seller’s perspective, an agreement structured as a
grant of rights to the buyer with a license back from the buyer to the seller can be riskier
than a simple reservation of the same rights. A license could be terminated or set aside
(e.g., in the event of the buyer’s bankruptcy), whereas a reservation typically operates
independently of the buyer. Additionally, a license back from buyer to seller must
necessarily be granted post-assignment, creating a risk in the event that the assignment is
itself found defective in some way.
148
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infringement have also been found important, at least in certain
cases.153 Beyond these rights, other rights and interests in the
patent, including financial interests and a seller’s retained rights to
practice or sublicense the patent to affiliates, tend to be less
important.154 Fourth, the form of an agreement transferring patent
rights is not dispositive, but rather it is the intent of the parties that
controls.155 To ensure transfer of all substantial rights, it is not
necessary, but may be helpful, to structure the agreement as an
assignment rather than as an exclusive license. It may also be
helpful to state that any rights retained by the seller of the patent
are not intended to interfere with the buyer’s rights to practice and
enforce the patent, as these rights are the most important in
the analysis.
The Authors hope that in laying out certain rules and trends
within the Federal Circuit’s all substantial rights doctrine, readers
will feel confident in structuring an agreement to transfer patent
rights that will predictably and reliably allocate ownership of
the patent.
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